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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Ninth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! This event is the 
highlight of the year for the Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) because it showcases the findings of recently completed 
research projects—and that research activity has been prolific! Since the ARP’s founding in 
2003, over 800 original research reports have been added to the acquisition body of 
knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 60 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and hope this symposium will spark even more participation. 
We encourage you to be active participants at the symposium. Indeed, active 
participation has been the hallmark of previous symposia. We purposely limit attendance to 
350 people to encourage just that. In addition, this forum is unique in its effort to bring 
scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. Seldom will you get the opportunity to interact with so 
many top DoD acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both 
in the formal panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, 
breaks, and the day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to 
establish new teaming arrangements for future research work. In the words of one senior 
government official, “I would not miss this symposium for the world as it is the best forum 
I’ve found for catching up on acquisition issues and learning from the great presenters.” 
We expect affordability to be a major focus at this year’s event. It is a central tenet of 
the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiatives, and budget projections indicate it will continue to 
be important as the nation works its way out of the recession. This suggests that research 
with a focus on affordability will be of great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to 
come. Whether you’re a practitioner or scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
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 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department 
of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this symposium. 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Addressing Risk in the Acquisition Lifecycle With 
Enterprise Simulation 
Doug Bodner—Bodner is a senior research engineer in the Tennenbaum Institute at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology. His research focuses on computational analysis and decision support for 
design, operation, and transformation of enterprise systems. His work has spanned a number of 
industries, including automotive, electronics, energy, health care, military acquisition, paper and pulp, 
semiconductors, and telecommunications. He is a senior member of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Institute of Industrial Engineers (IIE), and a member of the 
Institute for Operations Research and Management Science (INFORMS). He is a registered 
professional engineer in the State of Georgia. [bodner@gatech.edu] 
Abstract 
Defense acquisition is characterized by significant levels of risk throughout the lifecycle. Risk, 
of course, may result in undesirable outcomes. Deriving from many sources, both technical 
and organizational, risk is inherently a sociotechnical phenomenon in enterprises such as 
acquisition. As such, it is difficult to address. At the same time, fiscal pressures are causing 
decreased funding and increased expectations for acquisition performance. This points to the 
importance of risk characterization and mitigation. Our previous work has focused on using 
simulation to model and analyze acquisition processes and incentives in order to understand 
how they can be designed to improve outcomes. Traditional simulation analysis is not well 
suited to modeling the sociotechnical complexities of risk in a systematic way, though. This 
paper presents a decision/event network construct implemented within enterprise simulation 
models to represent the complexities of risk over time. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program 
is analyzed with respect to risk and potential outcomes using this enterprise simulation 
framework that accounts for sociotechnical phenomena. Risk mitigation strategies are 
identified and presented. 
Introduction 
Defense acquisition is characterized by significant levels of risk throughout the 
lifecycle of new system development, production, and sustainment. Fundamentally, risk 
results from the combination of an uncertain future (probabilities) and its potential bad 
outcomes (magnitudes). Classic risk drivers in acquisition include immature technologies, 
overly optimistic baseline cost and schedule estimates, overly stringent requirements, poorly 
understood implicit requirements, and changing missions and environments. Increasingly, 
risks come from new sources, such as fiscal pressures on government spending and 
transformative initiatives in the acquisition enterprise. 
This paper presents an enterprise simulation approach to analyzing risk in major 
acquisition programs. This approach models interactions between forms and agencies 
within the acquisition enterprise, and it also includes a decision/event network that is issued 
to characterize the relationships of risk drivers to outcomes. The approach is used to model 
the acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a large-scale acquisition program that has 
seen effects from risk. This program is currently in a combination of system design and 
development, and low-rate initial production. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes 
enterprise simulation in the context of risk analysis. Then the F-35 program is discussed, 
with a particular focus on risks and current outcomes. An enterprise simulation model of the 
F-35 program is presented next. Risks within the model are analyzed and discussed. Finally, 
conclusions and future research are presented. 
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Simulation of Acquisition Programs 
Computer simulation has traditionally been used to assess system performance 
during design and operation. One widespread use of simulation has been in manufacturing, 
as a means of predicting such metrics as throughput and cost for a factory system (Smith, 
2003). Simulation enables the analysis of behavior and performance over time, taking into 
account probabilistic effects (Law, 2007). Simulation can provide analysis under different 
system design and operating scenarios, thus enabling possible system designs or 
modifications to be studied prior to adoption. 
In recent years, simulation has seen application in a number of additional acquisition-
related areas beyond manufacturing, including supply chain design and analysis (Kleijnen, 
2005), software system development (Madachy, 2008), acquisition processes (Bodner, 
Rahman, & Rouse, 2010; Ford & Dillard, 2009), and fleet sustainment (Smith, Searles, 
Thompson, & Cranwell, 2006). While these are important constituent elements of a large-
scale acquisition program, there are other important elements to consider, such as the 
enterprise nature of the public-private partnership that comprises the program. Increasingly, 
firms that develop and manufacture complex products and systems employ an enterprise 
paradigm that involves a large number of stakeholder firms (Bodner & Lee, in press). 
The traditional use of simulation has been to study the technical aspects associated 
with acquisition program elements. These include work processes, quality, schedules, part 
flows, inventory levels, bottlenecks, costs, and lead times. While this type of analysis is quite 
useful, it does not capture the sociotechnical aspects of the enterprise, with its multi-actor 
collaborations, decision-making, and risks. Recently, two related types of simulation 
methods have come into usage—agent-based simulation (Hillebrand & Stender, 1994; 
Saam & Schmidt, 2001) and organizational simulation (Nissen, 2007; Prietula, Carley, & 
Gasser, 1998; Rouse & Boff, 2005). Agent-based simulation focuses on the interaction of 
different agents in an eco-system, where agents can represent individuals or firms. For 
example, it has been used to model supply chain actor interactions (Albino, Carbonara, & 
Giannoccaro, 2007). Organizational simulation seeks to model the behavior of people and 
firms in the context of a world model and organizational story. A world model represents the 
elements internal to the organization being modeled, as well as those relevant external 
elements. The organizational story represents a scenario being modeled. Organizational 
simulation has been used to model healthcare delivery, research and development, and 
electronics design (Rouse & Bodner, 2009). These two types of simulation are relevant to 
enterprise modeling needs in studying large-scale acquisition programs. Enterprise 
modeling has increasingly been incorporated in simulation (Barjis, 2011; Glazner, 2011). 
Enterprise Simulation and Acquisition Risk Analysis 
Recent work has extended the concept of organizational simulation to an enterprise 
simulation framework with an agent-based model for actors and a decision/event network to 
represent a risk-focused way of representing an organizational story (Bodner & Rouse, 
2010). Agents represent organizations (e.g., firms or agencies) that participate in the 
enterprise. They can perform a variety of actions in the enterprise, among them are the 
following: 
 communicate with other agents, 
 react to incentives and information, 
 accrue costs, 
 change variables such as schedule targets or budgets, 
 progress through processes and tasks,  
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 restructure a program, or 
 terminate a program. 
Figure 1 shows an example set of interactions in an acquisition context. The 
government program office interacts with the lead contractor, as well as with other agencies. 
The lead contractor manages the contractor network. Note that some contractors may be 
sub-contracted to multiple contractors. In a typical major program, of course, there are 
dozens of agencies, some outside the Department of Defense (DoD), and there are 
thousands of contractors. 
 
Figure 1. Example Interactions of Agents as Firms or Agencies 
In terms of a risk-focused organizational story, this framework utilizes a concept from 
interactive drama and artificial intelligence, that of a drama manager (Roberts & Isbell, 
2008). Interactive drama is a narrative implemented in computational form, similar to a 
game, in which a user interacts with a story. The drama manager interacts with the story 
flow to give the story particular characteristics (e.g., simplicity versus complexity). It does 
this through a construct known as a plot point model, which abstracts important events in 
the plot of the story. A plot point model is organized as a directed acyclic graph of plot point 
nodes, some of which may have precedence relationships between them (i.e., arcs), and 
some of which may be mutually exclusive. A precedence relationship from node 1 and node 
2 (i.e., node 1 precedes node 2, or 1→2) implies that for node 2 to occur, node 1 must 
occur. Given precedence relationships from multiple plot points to a particular plot point, 
only one of the predecessor plot points needs to occur to allow the successor plot point to 
occur (i.e., an “or” relationship among the precedence relationships). A precedence 
relationship can be mandatory in that the predecessor must occur for the successor node to 
occur (i.e., enabling “and” relationships). 
The graph is acyclic to disallow two or more plot points from simultaneously having 
precedence relationships among them. A terminal plot point represents an end to the story. 
The drama manager may influence the plot so that certain events occur (or are more likely 
to occur), or it may likewise prevent certain events from occurring. The particular path of plot 
points realized in an interactive drama reflects the instantiated plot. 
Adapted to a simulation context, the plot point model (or decision/event network) is 
used to represent important events in the simulation that relate, for example, to risk in the 
unfolding simulation. Thus, the role of a drama manager (or simulation manager) in the 
simulation context is to guide the simulation through a particular set of decision/event nodes 
to reflect a certain risk profile. The outcome of the simulation can then be compared to the 















`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=77 - 
=
plot point model, and the simulation. Certain events in the simulation model correspond to 
decisions or events in the decision/event network. However, many events and behaviors do 
not correspond to network nodes. Nodes 2 and 3 are mutually exclusive (only one at most 
may happen). Arcs 4→7 and 5→7 are mandatory precedence relationships, meaning that 
both nodes 4 and 5 must occur for 7 to occur. 
 
Figure 2. Simulation and Decision/Network Interaction 
The decision/event network prescribes the relationships among decisions and 
events, not the outcome of a particular organizational story. An outcome is realized by a 
particular sequence of decisions and events. A valid sequence, or path, must conform to the 
precedence and exclusion constraints of the decision/event network, and it can have only 
one terminal node (at the path end). A particular decision/event network can generate many 
different paths. An example valid path from Figure 2 is 1→2→6, as is 1→3→4→5→7.  
Given a particular decision/event network, the enterprise simulation framework 
conducts a pre-processing operation to determine the set of possible paths, and the result is 
returned in the form of a partial game tree. A game tree is a construct from game theory that 
defines moves that two players may make as alternating nodes in the tree. The simulation 
manager and simulation correspond to the two players in this context. Nodes in the 
decision/event network represent actions taken by the simulation (i.e., decisions and 
events). The simulation manager’s actions are not represented in a path, as these actions 
are intended to influence the path followed for a particular simulation outcome. Hence, the 
set of paths is a partial game tree. The partial game tree for the decision/event network is 
shown in Figure 3. 
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The simulation manager’s actions are based on its evaluation function. This function 
is used to evaluate paths for selection of a next node in the decision/event network and a 
corresponding simulation manager action. For risk, the evaluation uses the expected value 
of a function of the program’s schedule and cost outcomes for selection of the next node. 
This must be determined over the set of path remainders associated with each candidate 
next node, where a path remainder is the set of nodes comprising the rest of a particular 
path given a current node location. 
For example, assume that the simulation has executed the partial path 1→3→4 in 
Figure 3. Nodes 5 and 6 are the two candidates to execute next. The possible path 
remainders are 6, 5→6 and 6→7. Node 6 is evaluated using simply the estimated schedule 
and cost values from the path remainder of itself. Node 5 is evaluated using a function of the 
schedule and cost values of the two other path remainders. 
Of course, the simulation is stochastic, and the evaluation can only use estimates of 
schedules and costs. Another issue is the computational complexity associated with the 
evaluation over a large decision/event network. Thus, the look-ahead capability to analyze a 
path remainder can be limited to a certain number of nodes in the path. 
The enterprise simulation modeling framework is implemented using AnyLogic™ with 
a set of Java class extensions for the agent models, the simulation manager, plot point 
models, and partial game trees. AnyLogic™ is a commercially available simulation product 
that supports multi-paradigm modeling using discrete-event, agent-based, and system 
dynamics simulation. 
F-35 Program 
One major acquisition program that is of interest with respect to risk analysis, and 
application of the enterprise simulation framework, is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 
program. The F-35 program grew out of the need for a next generation tactical fighter fleet 
to replace the aging fleet of F-16s and F-18s. Due to the large size of these legacy fleets, 
the Joint Strike Fighter effort started as an ambitious, large-scale concept. As the program 
became more defined, Boeing and Lockheed Martin Aeronautics led consortia that 
developed concept aircraft in a competition for the system design and development (SDD) 
contract. When the Lockheed consortium won, the Joint Strike Fighter program entered into 
SDD in 2001. The initial planned procurement quantity was 2,852 planes. 
The JSF actually consists of three variant aircraft (Gertler, 2012). The first (F-35A) is 
a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft designed for the Air Force. The second 
(F-35B) is a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft designed for the Marines. 
The third (F-35C) is a carrier-suitable aircraft (CV) designed for the Navy. 
The JSF program has used a transformative approach to acquisition of a major 
weapons system. In this context, transformation means a major change in the enterprise, 
moving from an as-is enterprise to a to-be enterprise, with specific intents (Kessler & Heath, 
2006). The transformative elements of this approach include the following: 
 Rather than the traditional command-and-control relationship between the lead 
contractor and its suppliers, the contract required a partnership model among 
three firms—Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, BAE Systems, and Northrop 
Grumman (Bennett, Kessler, & McGinnis, in press).  
 The program was planned as a global effort, whereby design, development, and 
production activities would occur globally across an international consortium of 
firms, rather than primarily at one single site. Countries with firms represented in 
the consortium would be partners, agreeing to purchase F-35s (Kapstein, 2004). 
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 Modeling and simulation technologies have been used extensively in SDD, 
essentially to provide a “testing in software” capability. The confidence in this 
testing approach enabled substantial concurrency to be designed into the 
program between development and production so that production started prior to 
the completion of flight testing (DoD, 2011). The level of concurrency was higher 
than in similar programs. 
 The program is developing three variants using a common platform targeting a 
high level of commonality of components across the three variants. The intent is 
to reduce cost (promote affordability) while providing aircraft to support three 
mission types. The three mission types require different high-level technical 
capabilities (stealth, STOVL, supersonic, and carrier capabilities) that historically 
have not been combined to this degree in a single craft or platform (Blickstein et 
al., 2011). 
 The production supply network was planned for use by sustainment (Bennett et 
al., in press). 
One of the first efforts in the SDD phase was to set up the global technology 
infrastructure needed to support the design of the F-35 among the different firms involved. 
This was a substantive and transformative initiative that required significant alignment 
among the enterprise leadership and major changes to processes among all stakeholder 
firms (Bodner et al., 2011). The technology requirements were challenging—providing real-
time global access to the design database subject to myriad management and security 
constraints. The technical challenges turned out to be less difficult than the social and 
process changes needed. Overall, the setup of the technology infrastructure was deemed 
successful. 
Nevertheless, such major transformative elements entail risk (Rouse, 2006), and 
there have been a number of less-than-desirable outcomes (and potential future outcomes) 
for the program. 
 A reduction in planned purchases of 400 units occurred early in SDD, driving up 
unit costs (Blickstein et al., 2011). 
 In the earlier part of SDD, there were weight and design issues that required 
significant additional effort to address (Blickstein et al., 2011). 
 The weapons bay of the CV variant was redesigned for larger payload, resulting 
in the same redesign for the STOVL and CTOL variants. This redesign caused 
weight and stability problems for the STOVL (Blickstein et al., 2011). 
 Due to schedule slippages and cost growth, the program was re-baselined in 
2004 and 2007 (Blickstein et al., 2011). 
 After the DoD’s Joint Estimating Team issued a report in late 2009 stating that 
the program would need an additional 30 months to complete SDD, the program 
was restructured (GAO, 2011), adding 13 months to the SDD schedule (as well 
as the needed funding), and withholding $614 million in award fees from the lead 
contractor. Three aircraft were also added to early production. 
 In 2010, the program was found to have increased in cost over both the original 
baseline and the then-current baseline by enough that it was certified with a 
Nunn-McCurdy breach (Blickstein et al., 2011).  
 Continued technical issues with the STOVL variant resulted in that part of the 
program being placed on a two-year “probation,” with its production schedule 
moved back (GAO, 2011). 
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 The U.S. government’s fiscal situation has called into question whether the 
planned quantities of aircraft will be purchased. Already the U.K. government has 
reduced its planned purchases (Gertler, 2012). 
Blickstein et al. (2011) conducted a root cause analysis of the Nunn-McCurdy breach 
and identified the following underlying risk factors as root causes: 
 SDD was designed around a concept demonstrator rather than around a 
prototype that would have accounted better for producibility. 
 The engineering strategy focused on developing the CTOL variant first, rather 
than tackling the more difficult engineering design and development of the 
STOVL. 
 The original baseline was overly optimistic on cost and schedule due to 
assumptions on component commonality and technology integration. 
These in turn drove other issues that resulted in the eventual breach. Getting the 
high-level technical capabilities across the variants was more technically challenging than 
anticipated, involving extensive trade-offs. The initial weight problems caused redesign, and 
these design changes had to be distributed throughout the enterprise of collaborators. Due 
to the large number of suppliers, this process delayed test and production and hence drove 
up costs. Delays also resulted in work being done with higher labor rates. 
The issue of concurrency has been raised as a cause of the program’s cost and 
schedule issues (DoD, 2011). Historical analysis has indicated that concurrency has not 
been a major cost and schedule risk driver (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 1988). 
However, this type of analysis likely does not account for the complexity of the JSF program. 
At present, the program is entering a fifth low-rate initial production (LRIP) increment 
that is a fixed-price contract with risk sharing between the government and contractor 
(Gertler, 2012). 
Simulation Model 
An example enterprise simulation model and associated decision/event network for 
the SDD portion of the F-35 program (and overlap with low-rate initial production) is now 
presented. This model mainly addresses the U.S.-funded portion of the JSF program. 
Foreign partner purchases are treated as exogenous effects.  
The outcomes of interest in the simulation model relate to schedule and cost. Let i be 
an index for fiscal years since the start of SDD in October of 2001. Thus, i = 1 corresponds 
to FY2002, i = 2 to FY2003, and so on. Let j likewise be an index for fiscal years. Let k index 
the variants, with k = 1 representing the CTOL, k = 2 representing the STOVL, and k = 3 
representing the CV. Finally, let l be an index for program milestones, with l = 1 representing 
preliminary design review (PDR), l = 2 representing critical design review (CDR) for the 
CTOL variant, l = 3 representing CDR for the STOVL variant, l = 4 representing CDR for the 
CV variant, l = 5 representing flight test start for the CTOL variant, l = 6 representing flight 
test start for the STOVL variant, l = 7 representing flight test start for the CV variant, l = 8 
representing flight test finish for the CTOL variant, l = 9 representing flight test finish for the 
STOVL variant, l = 10 representing flight test finish for the CV variant, l = 11 representing 
start of the first LRIP increment, l = 12 representing start of the second LRIP increment, l = 
13 representing start of the third LRIP increment, l = 14 representing start of the fourth LRIP 
increment, l = 15 representing start of the fifth LRIP increment, and l = 16 representing start 
of production ramp-up. 
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The following state variables for the program’s schedule and cost targets are 
defined. Note that the target values can change from year to year, which occurs, for 
example, when the schedule targets or planned purchases are moved back. 
Cij = cost target in year i for development costs in year j ($) 
Qijk = planned quantities in year i for procurement in year j of variant k (number of craft) 
Uijk = per-unit cost target in year i for procurement in year j of variant k ($) 
Sil = schedule target in year i for milestone l (number of months since SDD kick-off) 
Ll = contract cost for LRIP increment l (l = 11, 12 … 15) 
State variables for program status are needed. Let q refer to the original target for 
the status variable, r to the current target, s to the current progress, and t to the current time 
(since beginning of SDD). Finally, let u denote an index for capabilities, with u = 1 being 
stealth, u = 2 being supersonic speed, u = 3 being STOVL capable, and u = 4 being carrier 
capable. The following variables are defined. 
Gq = original target for completion effort of global design capability = 100% 
Grt = current target for completion effort of global design capability at time t (% of Gq) 
Gst = current progress toward completion of global design capability at time t (% of Gq) 
Dq = original target for completion effort of engineering design files = 100% 
Drt = current target for completion effort of engineering design files at time t (% of Dq) 
Dst = current progress toward completion of engineering design files at time t (% of Dq) 
Kq = original target for completion effort of software = 100% 
Krt = current target for completion effort of software at time t (% of Kq) 
Kst = current progress toward completion of software at time t (% of Kq) 
Fkq = original target for completion effort of flight testing for variant k = 100% 
Fkrt = current target for completion effort of flight testing for variant k at time t (% of Fkq) 
Fkst = current progress toward completion of flight testing for variant k a time t (% of Fkq) 
Mkqu = original target for completion effort of capability u for variant k = 100% 
Mkrut = current target for completion effort of capability u for variant k at time t (% of Mkqu) 
Mksut = current progress toward completion of capability u for variant k a time t (% of 
Mkqu) 
Plq = original target for completion effort of LRIP increment l (l = 11, 12 … 15) = 100% 
Plrt = current target for completion effort of LRIP increment l (l = 11, 12 … 15) at time t (% 
of Plq) 
Plst = current progress toward completion of LRIP increment l (l = 11, 12 … 15) at time t 
(% of Plq) 
Wkt = current weight of variant k as a percentage of the maximum weight target at time t 
(%) 
E = level of concurrency designed into program 
Ht = current level of component commonality among variants at time t (%) 
At = SDD cost accrual rate at time t ($ per time unit) 
Vt = cumulative SDD cost accrued through time t ($) 
Blt = cost accrual rate for LRIP increment l (l = 11, 12 … 15) at time t ($ per time unit) 
Xlt = cumulative cost for LRIP increment l (l = 11, 12 … 15) through time t ($) 
Note that Gq is a constant and reflects an original completion effort level of 100%. 
The actual work to be done for completion, Grt, may increase (or decrease) over time. The 
percentage toward actual completion is thus Gst/Grt. The same model is used for engineering 
design files, software, capability achievement, flight testing, and LRIP completion. It should 
be noted for the capability completion variables that variables exist only for valid 
combinations of variant k and capability u (i.e., there is no variable for the CTOL having a 
carrier capability). 
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The actor model is relatively simple and consists of a government agent and a 
contractor agent. The government agent oversees the program, and the contractor agent 
executes the work. The government can make decisions such as program restructure or 
program cancellation. The contractor has parameters that govern its progress rate toward 
completion of the various efforts needed for the program (e.g., software). The contractor 
also has an alignment parameter that reflects the extent to which its executive leadership 
and technical management across the enterprise are aligned with a strategy to stand up the 
global design technology infrastructure. This parameter affects the rate at which that 
capability is achieved. In future versions of the model, the contractor agent will be replaced 
with multiple agents representing different contractor firms, and the alignment parameter will 
be refined so that individual firm alignments with enterprise strategy are modeled. 
The decision/event model is shown in Figure 4. On the right side of the figure are 
various program milestones (e.g., design reviews, flight testing, and production). The left 
side focuses largely on decisions made by the government and contractor agents that 
influence program execution (e.g., program design), as well as on exogenous events (e.g., 
reduction in planned foreign partner purchases). The decisions on the left side reflect a 
number of risk drivers in JSF acquisition. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=83 - 
=
 
Figure 4. JSF SDD Decision/Event Network 
Nodes 19–23 represent program design decisions, and they are grouped to reflect 
that they must be preceded by contract award, and that they precede preliminary design 
review (PDR). The mutual exclusion constraints mean that only one of nodes 20 and 21 and 
one of nodes 22 and 23 would occur to enable node 25. Nodes 26–32 represent post-PDR 
program management decisions. Except for node 29 (which cannot occur until after the first 
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Table 1. Decision/Event Descriptions 
Decision/Event Node Description 
1. Contract Awarded SDD contract awarded to Lockheed Martin consortium. This 
initiates the organizational story. 
2. Global Design Capability The enterprise achieves capability to support JSF design via 
global technology infrastructure. 
3. PDR The program passes preliminary design review.  
4. CTOL CDR The CTOL variant passes critical design review. Note that 
CDR is a separate event for each variant. 
5. STOVL CDR The STOVL variant passes critical design review. 
6. CV CDR The CV variant passes critical design review. 
7. CTOL Flight Test Start The CTOL variant starts flight testing. Once again, flight tests 
are modeled separately for each variant. 
8. STOVL Flight Test Start The STOVL variant starts flight testing. 
9. CV Flight Test Start The CV variant starts flight testing. 
10. CTOL Flight Test Finish The CTOL variant finishes flight testing. 
11. STOVL Flight Test 
Finish 
The STOVL variant finishes flight testing. 
12. CV Flight Test Finish The CV variant finishes flight testing. 
13. LRIP1 The first low-rate initial production contract is initiated. The 
details (cost and number of each variant) are captured in the 
simulation. 
14. LRIP2 The second low-rate initial production contract is initiated. 
15. LRIP3 The third low-rate initial production contract is initiated. 
16. LRIP4 The fourth low-rate initial production contract is initiated. 
17. LRIP5 The fifth low-rate initial production contract is initiated. The 
current model assumes only five LRIPs. In future versions, 
the number will be variable, with the simulation having the 
capability to generate LRIPs. 
18. Production Ramp-up Production ramp-up begins, ending SDD. This is a terminal 
decision/event. 
19. Prototype Development This represents the program enterprise decision to develop or 
not develop a prototype aircraft in addition to the concept 
aircraft that won the SDD contract. Note that an affirmative 
decision delays PDR. 
20. CTOL-First Strategy The program decides to design the CTOL variant first. 
21. STOVL-First Strategy The program decides to design the STOVL variant first. Note 
that this is mutually exclusive with the CTOL-first strategy. 
22. High Concurrency The program designs a high level of concurrency into the 
program. The baseline case assumes moderate concurrency. 
23. No Concurrency The program designs no concurrency into the program. Note 
that this is mutually exclusive with the high concurrency 
decision. 
24. Collaborative Alignment The enterprise achieves or does not achieve collaborative 
alignment on the changes needed to enable the global SDD 
technology infrastructure to be stood up. Achievement 
includes executive alignment among partner organizations, 
as well as technical management alignment. Achievement 
speeds up technology development over the case where 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=éêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=85 - 
=
there is little alignment.  
25. Program Design Program design is complete. 
26. Weight Reduction The program engages in a major weight reduction effort. 
27. Nunn-McCurdy Breach A Nunn-McCurdy breach is declared. 
28. Program Restructure The program is restructured, changing cost and schedule 
targets. 
29. Fixed-Cost Contract The contract moves from cost plus to fixed price. It is 
assumed that this cannot occur until after the first LRIP. 
30. Major Planned U.S. 
Purchase Reduction 
The U.S. decides to reduce its purchase quantity. 
31. Major Planned Foreign 
Purchase Reduction 
Foreign partners decide to reduce their purchase quantity. 
32. Program Canceled The government cancels the program. 
Risk Analysis and Mitigation 
Current work is addressing detailed analysis of risk in the JSF SDD phase using the 
enterprise simulation model. This section describes the analysis being done. 
1. One set of analysis involves the effect of having a high degree of alignment 
among enterprise stakeholders for the strategy needed to stand up the global 
design technology infrastructure needed to support design efforts across the 
enterprise. Without alignment, this capability is delayed (thus delaying initial 
design activities) and may not be as effective as with better alignment, 
resulting in downstream design issues that must be addressed (causing 
increased cost and delayed schedules). 
2. Another set of analysis involves program design decisions. High levels of 
concurrency can shorten the time until systems are produced and deployed, 
thus helping meet schedule targets. However, undiscovered issues may 
affect production and cause rework, thus negatively affecting cost and 
schedule. Low levels of concurrency on the surface extend the schedule 
beyond what is possible with higher levels, but have less risk from design 
issues. Similarly, producing a prototype system delays design of the real 
system. Is this compensated for by improvements in schedule and cost of 
downstream activities? 
3. Finally, what is the effect of exogenous events such as major reductions in 
planned purchases? This tends to drive up per-unit costs, making future 
purchases more costly and less likely to occur. 
Conclusion and Future Research 
This paper has presented a novel enterprise simulation approach for analyzing risk in 
acquisition programs. Risk continues to be a major concern in acquisition, especially as 
program budgets are under increasing pressure from fiscal constraints. Simulation is 
appealing to use in risk analysis since it enables probabilistic analysis of system and 
organizational behavior and outcomes. 
The enterprise simulation approach differs from traditional simulation in two 
important ways. First, traditional simulation approaches focus on analyzing the technical 
aspects of system and organizational behaviors. Increasingly, sociotechnical phenomena 
are important to the success and failure of large programs due to their nature as enterprises. 
For instance, the level of alignment among the JSF enterprise actors as to a strategy for 
standing up the global design technology infrastructure is an important sociotechnical 
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behavior that influences the time needed for this activity, as well as the success of the 
outcome.  
Second, the enterprise simulation approach explicitly models a decision/event 
network that can be used to link risk drivers with downstream program activities and 
outcomes. Traditional simulation approaches tend to model this implicitly, so that it may not 
be effectively modeled, and also so that the organizational story (path realization) is not 
explicitly presented.  
Future work involves continued elaboration and validation of the model, as well as 
analysis of particular risks. 
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